where the denominator is strictly negative due to the second-order condition for α * . Thus, to prove that dα * /dk 1 > 0, we need to show that the numerator is positive. We know that , (A.28) where the denominator is strictly negative due to the second-order condition for e * 1 . Thus, de 1 , dρ 1 (e * 1 )/dσ A 1 , dρ 1 (e * 1 )/dk 1 < 0.
2
Early Stage Investment and Valuation.
Consider first our base model with endogenous effort. Differentiating V * 1 w.r.t. k 1 yields dV * 1 .29) Note that dV * 1 /dk 1 > 0 when k 1 → 0. Thus, the equilibrium valuation V * 1 is decreasing in k 1 when k 1 is sufficiently small.
Next, suppose the entrepreneur's effort e 1 is exogenous, and define ρ 1 ≡ ρ 1 (e 1 ). The early stage deal values are then given by (A.31) where c is the entrepreneurs disutility of providing effort e 1 . The optimal equity share for the angel, α * , then satisfies the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, which accounts for the outside option of each party (U E 1 for the entrepreneur, and 0 for the angel because of free entry). Let D E 1 and D A 1 denote the deal values reflecting the Nash bargaining solution, which are given by
The equilibrium equity share for the angel, α * , then satisfies D
The equilibrium early stage valuation is V *
The denominator is always non-negative. Moreover, note that N ≥ 0 for k 1 → 0, which implies that dV * 1 /dk 1 ≥ 0 for k 1 → 0. To show that dV * 1 /dk 1 > 0 for all k 1 > 0, it is thus sufficient to verify that dN/dk 1 > 0:
We need to find the sign of d 2 α * /dk * 1 . We start by taking the first derivative of α * w.r.t. k 1 :
It is easy to see that
where
We then get
(A.41)
Note that
This implies that dN/dk 1 > 0, and therefore dV * 1 /dk 1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Moreover, we will show in Proof of Proposition 3 that dU
For a given α we find that
Moreover, applying the Envelope Theorem we get dD
Thus, the bargaining frontier shifts outwards, so that dD 
where de * 1 /dU E 2 > 0 and dΓ/dα = 0 (see Eq. (A.1)). Moreover,
VC market: derivation of deal values and equity shares. Let CV i denote the value generated by the coalition i = EAV, EV, EA, AV, E, A, V . Using the Shapley value we get the following general deal values from the tripartite bargaining game:
We note that CV EAV = π and
The deal values then allow us to derive the equilibrium equity shares β E * , β A * , and β V * .
The equilibrium equity share for entrepreneurs, β E * , ensures that their actual net payoff equals their deal value from the bargaining game:
Likewise we get
Derivation of VC market equilibrium. The first part of the derivation follows along the lines of the derivation of the angel market equilibrium: Using Eq. (13) we get θ *
2 . Moreover, using Eq. (14) and the
where m E * 2 = gρ 1 (e * 1 )x * 1 . Furthermore, using Eq. (15) and q
Finally, using the equilibrium equity share β V * for VCs we can write V * 2 as follows:
Proof of Proposition 3. First we need to derive a condition which defines U E 2 . We can write Eq. (12) as
, we get the following condition which defines U E 2 :
Consider the equilibrium degree of competition θ *
with dU
Moreover, we get
We have shown in Proof of Proposition 2 that dx * 1 /dφ 2 > 0 and dx
Likewise, we have shown that dρ 1 (e * 1 )/dφ 2 > 0 and dρ 1 (e * 1 )/dδ 2 , dρ 1 (e * 1 )/dσ 2 , dρ 1 (e * 1 )/dσ V 2 , dρ 1 (e * 1 )/dk 2 < 0. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that dT /d(φ 2 θ * 2 ) > 0. Using our comparative statics results for θ * 2 , we can infer that dT /dφ 2 , dT /dδ 2 , dT /dσ 2 > 0, and dT /dσ V 2 , dT /dk 2 < 0. All this implies that dm V * 2 /dφ 2 > 0 and dm 
(A.75) 
The new equilibrium equity share for entrepreneurs, β E * , ensures that their actual net payoff equals their deal value from the bargaining game:
Proof of Proposition 5. We first show that dU
Thus, using Eq. (12) we define
where a 2 = φ 2 2 /σ V 2 . Using Cramer's rule we get
This condition can be written as
From F and G we know that
so that we can write condition (A.96) as follows:
We now show that T < 0. Using the definitions of D A 2 and D V 2 we can write
This condition is satisfied for all λ ≥ 0 because π > U E 2 + U A 2 . Thus, the numerator of dU A 2 /dλ is strictly positive. Consequently, dU
Next we analyze the effects of λ on the early stage equilibrium variables. Consider the equilibrium degree of competition θ * 1 . We get
This implies dD
Thus, dθ * 1 /dλ < 0. Now consider the equilibrium entry of entrepreneurs m E * 1 . Using Eq. (A.11), we get
where the denominator is positive. Consequently, dU
Using Eq. (A.1) we can derive the following expression for D 
thus, this condition is satisfied when X ≥ 1. Note that dD E 1 /dα < 0 and dD
It is easy to show that the joint surplus is maximized when α = 0 (which maximizes effort incentives for the entrepreneur); thus
so that X ≥ 1. Consequently, dU E 1 /dλ < 0, and therefore dm
Next consider the equilibrium inflow of angels, m A * 1 , which is defined by In general, the effect on m E * 2 is ambiguous as de * 1 /dλ > 0 and dx * 1 /dλ < 0. However, we can see that dm E * 2 /dλ < 0 when ρ 1 (e *
